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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ANC African National Congress (South Africa)
AQIM al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (Sahel)
CIA Central Intelligence AgencyUnited States of America
CIRI

In reference to Cignarelli and Richards; a dataset of human rights abuses between

1981 and 2011.

DAC Development Assistance Committee (only includes European members in this analysis)
FRELIMO Frente de Libertação de Moçambique, Mozambique Liberation Front
GWOT Global War on Terror
MPLA Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola, People's Movmemnt for the Liberation
of Angola

OAU The Organisation of African Unity
PTS Political Terror Scale
RENAMO Resistência Nacional de Moçambique, Mozambique National Resistance
SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
TIV Trade indicator value; a metric developed by SIPRI
UNITA

União Nacional para a Indepêndencia Total de Angola, National Union for the

Total Independence of Angola

USA United States of America
USAID United States Agency for International Development
USSR Soviet Union
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Figure 1: A contemporary map of Africa, to provide context for current military aid, repression, and geographical location of the case studies. All visual creations are the author's
own.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
"There are no opponents in Zaire, because the notion of opposition has no place in our
mental universe. In fact, there are no political problems in Zaire."
 Mobutu Sese Soko

In the early 1960s, the Soviet Union sent military equipment and personnel to what was then
the Congofarther than it had ever sent aid before. Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba turned
to the Soviet Union after a United Nations peacekeeping force proved incapable and uninterested in expelling Belgian paratroopers from resource-rich provinces of the country. Support
arrived too late to stop the worst of the violence, and the Soviet presence was criticized by
the army and President Kasavubu for being too propagandistic. Two provinces seceded with
the support of Belgium; combined with Lumumba's expulsion from the cabinet, all signs
suggested that partitioning of the country was imminent. Just months after independence,
the Congo seemed poised to fragment and lose its potential as the star of Central Africa
(Wrong, 2001).
Enter Joseph Mobutu, Lumumba's former secretary during the independence negotiations
and now Army Chief of Sta. He had Kasavubu and Lumumba removed from oce to
give them time to settle their dierences. Soviet personnel were given 48 hours to leave.
Meanwhile, the responsibility and urgency of completely removing Lumumba from political
oce shifted from Congolese operatives to the United States Central Intelligence Agency
7
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(Hochschild, 1999). Ordered to poison Lumumba, CIA agents faltered, but eventually a
Belgian pilot and ring squad ew Lumumba into an opposition stronghold, shot him, then
dismembered and dissolved his body in acid. American, Belgian, and British insistence on
setting up the right man to lead the Congo emboldened Mobutu to rule the country as a
military dictator for thirty-two years (Wrong, 2001). However, American support for Mobutu
was contingent on access to the country's vast mining and rubber operations, and as a staging
ground for American and French intelligence operations throughout the region (Hochschild,
1999). Mobutu was undoubtedly emboldened by the dual purpose of his mandate: to lead
the Congo for the Congolese and to intertwine Congolese and American interests.
Mobutu's loyalty to his Western supporters was well-documented in his many visits to
Washington D.C. and Europe. Even more striking than his tailor-made leopard skin hat
was how warm and amicable Presidents Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush were towards
one of America's "most valued friends" (Hochschild, 1999). United States aid was continuous throughout Mobutu's rule, but so were Mobutu's constant demands for the torture
and assassination of political opponents, and diversion of Congolese wealth towards his own
enrichment (Wrong, 2001). The exploitation of Congo's resources for personal luxury produced uncanny parallels between Mobutu and his predecessor, King Leopold of Belgium
(Hochschild, 1999).
Mobutu's ascendancy to power in Congo is one particular case of American military
involvement, but the story seems to be one in a pattern rather than an extreme incident.
American military involvement is frequently connected to adverse political outcomes worldwide. Domestic legitimacy in the Congo was deeply compromised as a result of covert American and Belgian operations. But what happens in lower-prole, direct assistance that the
United States Armed Forces and Intelligence branches provide? Are there dierent observable implications, and more importantly, might American aid have more dire consequences
if government legitimacy is already compromised? This thesis addresses one hypothesis:
that American military aid is directly correlated with repression. This introduction provides
8
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opening remarks on the puzzle, hypothesis, causal mechanisms, and methodologies of this
analysis.

1.1

The Argument

the more American military aid a country receives, the more likely
its incumbents are to adopt repressive policies in later years. Many incumbents worldwide
I hypothesize that

observably rely on external legitimacy to support their administrations while frequently prioritizing the interests of external stakeholders over security and well-being of their citizens
(Chabal, 2002, 1992; Turner, 2002; Adam, 2002; Honwana, 2002; Mueller and Matthews,
2016). Regardless of the degree to which the government provides security and services to
citizens, international actors are all too willing to support regimes that lack domestic legitimacy (Mampilly, 2011; Englebert, 2009; Kakande, 2018). The United States currently
receives the most criticism for this unconditional support because of its oversized global involvement in recent decades. While support may be philanthropic (MacQueen, 1997; Newitt,
2002; Wood and Wright, 2016), a more cynical group of scholars identify most aidincluding
humanitarian aidas a strategic investment meant to inuence incumbents in the recipient
country. Similarly, analyses of the struggle for Cold War domination between the United
States and Soviet Union reveal the extent to which each country's exercise of productive
power shaped world events for forty years (Lukes, 2004; Fischer, 2010; Ikenberry, 2010; Gleijeses, 2010; Roseberg, 2010; Costigliola, 2010; Savranskaya and Taubman, 2010; Latham,
2010). Since the end of the Cold War the United States has been the world's only military superpower, dramatically outspending and outmaneuvering its wartime foesreal or
imaginaryfor nearly three decades. The power of American security agendas to inuence
incumbent success or demise has been documented throughout the Global War on Terror
(Smith, 2010; Kinsella, 2011; Devji, 2008; Keenan, 2009; Paull, 1982).
This argument is based on two categories of related studies. The rst set nd that inde9
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pendent variables similar to American military aid also result in observable repression. These
related independent variables include foreign direct investment (Kishi, Maggio and Raleigh,
2017) and foreign friendly or peacekeeping military involvement (Peksen, 2012; Dube and
Naidu, 2015). The authors nd a positive and signicant association between their respective independent variables and an increase in repression (operationalized as human rights
abuses). The second set of studies, although seemingly unrelated to American military aid,
suggest that increases in repression can be attributed to causes as disparate as a rapid growth
in youth population to the occurrence of a natural disaster and associated humanitarian aid
(Urdal, 2006; Das, 2017; Wood, 2008; Wood and Wright, 2016). Even in previous analyses
that make a direct association with some form of military engagement and increased repression, macroeconomic controls including GDP and oil rents per capita are included because
of their demonstrated correlation and causality with repression (Ross, 2013). One could
reasonably argue that this relationship may work in reversethat observable increases in human rights violations might result in increased American military aidand in some cases, it
might. By examining the natural sequence of events leading to increased repression in three
process tracing analyses, I demonstrate strong evidence that my hypothesized order is more
plausible than not.
This analysis does not intend to distract from other, alternative explanations for repression. As I see it, the central contribution is to introduce and provide evidence for the causal
explanations and magnitude of this particular relationship. Few analyses have proposed that
a series of causal mechanisms leads American military aid to result in an observable increase
in repression. While several of the above studies have demonstrated the utility of statistical
methods to estimate the relationship of their respective variables to repression, none have
tested the magnitude of the eect of American military aid on repression. Inserting this
analysis within decades of studies on the United States military and repression worldwide
represents a needed eort to incorporate contributions from security studies, peace studies,
and human rights analyses that can act in concert.
10
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Theorizing main variables

Repression
Repression is the act of subduing someone by institutional or physical force in order
to more readily fulll a political objective (Gibney et al., 2017; deMeritt, 2016). Because
physical force is more visible, major indexes of repression primarily document what are called
physical integrity violationstorture, unlawful detention, and extrajudicial killings. These
rights are protected under common law, meaning that state and non-state actors are expected
to not violate them, regardless of whether or not they have ratied major international
humanitarian covenants. Conversely, when force is applied vis-à-vis institutions, there is no
common law to prevent the repression of civil rights. The only civil liberty protected under
common law is that of religious freedom or expression. Otherwise, protections for journalists
and protesters are not universally guaranteed, even if there are negative consequences for
government actors that do violate these rights.
Governments opt to repress because they wish to survive or so that they can implement
policy preferences without challenge (deMeritt, 2016). Two core ndings are central to studies of repression: internal dissent incentivizes state repression, and repression varies with
domestic institutions (deMeritt, 2016). From here, we can ask such questions as: At what
level of dissent will an incumbent opt for repression? Why would incumbents in democracies use dierent repressive tactics than incumbents in autocracies? Although the level
of repression can be used to categorize regime type, the reverse is consistently more accurate. Repression is more costly in a democracy than an autocracy, because citizens in
a democracy have established other avenuesnamely, participating in governance and contesting incumbent decisionsto challenge the state and protect civil liberties Acemoglu and
Robinson (2006). DeMeritt also provides evidence for the hypothesis that repression peaks
in the middle of these two regime types. Citizens of democracies will dispose of repressive
agents through existing institutions, while citizens of autocracies are less likely to challenge
11
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repression because doing so is more costly (deMeritt, 2016). In the middle, it is equally likely
that repressive agents are booted from oce or citizens are completely subordinated to the
repressive state.
Recognizing an observable act of repression is not dicult; what can be dicult is measuring and exhaustively operating the magnitude of repression, even if it is visible. Coding
even one instance of repression can be challenging. Witnesses may not remember information
clearly, or the only witnesses may be the victims or perpetrators of an abuse. If the event
is a killing or disappearance, then the only witnesses are the perpetrators. As such, many
indexes are not based on event-count measures but rather on qualitative reports of existing
practices and conditions (deMeritt, 2016). This lends itself to an ordinal approach, wherein
information from data points is characterized in terms of more or less relative to other data
points. Social scientists also utilize ordinal measures for categorizing non-countable, conceptual events such as freedom of movement or women's economic rights (Cingranelli and
Richards, 2010). Ordinal measures introduce the coder's own subjective impression of general information. Without particular, specialized knowledge of a concept or context, the
coder may erroneously introduce variation by not controlling for their own subjectivity. The
principal limitation of this ordinal category approach to indexing repression is that it cannot
hold up when considering dynamic hypotheses about the potentially endogenous relationship between repression and dissent. Thus, I balance the limitations of measuring repression
quantitatively with process tracing, a qualitative supplement.

American Military Aid
According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), in 2017
American military expenditure was valued at $610 billion, the largest in the world and greater
than the next eight country's expenditures combined. The value of American arms exports
in 2016 was valued at $10 billion, and the total sum between 1976 and 2016 was $433 trillion
dollars. In the same period, annual military assistance provided through the United States
12
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Agency for International Development ranged from a few hundred dollars to $13 trillion
(Vietnam in 1973). Although these gures establish the US as a uniquely inuential military
aid donor, I will further dierentiate American aid from two other donors, the European
Union and the People's Republic of China. Much of this investigation will be accomplished
by providing an historical account of American military policy in the process tracing chapter.
I argue that American military aid constitutes a highly plausible explanation for variation
in repression throughout the world, further evidenced by noticeable dierentiation between
the Cold War and post-1989 periods of history.
"Aid" is a misleading term because in a military context, it is hardly ever philanthropic.
Military aid usually involves the transfer of a valuable military asset to a recipient country
in exchange for monetary compensation or permission for the stationing or free movement of
American personnel. To be clear, the exchange is procured between two defense forces, while
sales from an outside arms corporation are independent of American congressional donors.
For the purposes of my analysis, I am interested in aid that the recipient country implements itselfarms, training, intelligence, and American expertise. Although direct conict
intervention does aid the recipient country militarily, it is not managed by the host country
and is oftentimes unilateral. This means that the American troops on the ground, airstrikes,
and/or unsupported drone strikes will not be incorporated into my analysis. The presence
of Special Operations forces within a country remains an ambiguous case in several ways:
While there are American personnel with ghting capabilities on the ground, they sometimes
act in concert with domestic troops or do not provide combat assistance at all. Special Ops
intelligence, training, and expertise is continuously exchanged for domestic intelligence and
insight on the operations context, suggesting more of an equal exchange.1

1 Despite clear reasons for including SOF operations, currently there is not sucient public data on this
type of aid.
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Mechanisms

Misuse of disbursements for civilian policing
When agencies such as the Department of Defense request funds for disbursement to a
particular country, the justication does not necessarily have to support specic military
objectives in the recipient country. For example, the United States began sponsoring foreign
militaries that pledged to engage in the narcotics war in the 1980s. This principally aected
South and Central American countries, in several observable ways. In Chile for example,
computer hardware donated for policing potential narcotics suspects was easily applied towards constructing larger, civilian databases that kept opposition to Pinochet's government
at a minimum (Klare et al., 1981). And Dube and Naidu (2015) provide evidence that American military aid in Colombia during the late 1990s and 2000s resulted in political violence
at the hands of paramilitary groups in the name of policing. These examples show just
how easy it is for recipient governments to turn the support from the Defense Department
into oensive, repressive weapons. As Klare et al. (1981) note in their analysis, there is no
accountability mechanism in place that requires recipient governments to produce proof that
the disbursement was used as intended. Many American-made weapons are either donated
to or purchased by a recipient government as part of an aid disbursement, and then applied
to civilian and political policing rather than against contraband or violent opposition.

Juridical sovereignty
Any recipient government hoping to successfully redeploy military disbursements towards
greater repressive capacities must also hold a high degree of legitimacy in order to do so.
Otherwise, they risk numerous groups contesting the application of repressive measures. If
resistance is strong enough, repression will become more costly than concession. One way
that the balance of power can favor incumbents is if legitimacy is provided from an outside
14
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source. Juridical sovereignty,2 most commonly cited by scholars of African politics (Jackson
and Rosberg, 1982; Englebert, 2009; Mampilly, 2011; Warner, 1999), can help explain how
American military aid may further legitimate a recipient government. Englebert (2009)
identies the three main characteristics of juridical sovereignty: Non-national actors and
governments essentially grant leaders the right to rule, this right is distributed throughout
all levels of state bureaucracy, and because it is exogenous, juridical sovereignty persists even
when the state cannot fulll its domestic obligations. I argue that the provision of American
military aid acts similarly to juridical sovereignty, but moreover it requires an existing degree
of juridical sovereignty. American military aid introduces an element of legitimacy that is
distinct from recognition at the United Nations or any forum of international diplomacy.
Security investments directly legitimate the recipient state because its security interests
are joined with American security interests. The provision of military aid to a country
underscores incumbent desires to maintain or elevate their domestic or international status
(Iqbal and Starr, 2008). A country may become embroiled in conict if its neighbors are,
thus American eorts to prevent that eventuality; and, investing in a country's military
rather than stationing American troops elevates the perceived strength and legitimacy of the
recipient government. American aid also signals to regional enemies to American interests
that this particular country will receive American support as long as there is a security risk.

Security/resistance discourse
As I have derived from Kinsella (2011) in her discussion of three discoursesgender, innocence, and civilizationa discourse is a "conuence of political, moral, and legal judgments"
that conditions appearances [of what is being discussed] with "indisputable gravity and
authority." She utilizes Michel Foucault's framework of "series" in identifying historical moments when each of these three discourses converge, enabling her to demarcate the dierence
between the concepts of combatant and civilian. Discourse can be produced by any number of
2 Also referred to as international legal command.
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relevant actors: sub-national, national, regional, or international spokespersons, executives,
scholars and experts, and perhaps others. As it relates to security, these discourses will dene
military and non-military objectives in relation to the scope and magnitude of identiable
threats. I will analyze security discourse in each of my cases before and after aid has been
disbursed, and in the case of no aid disbursement I will look for open hostility or condemnation of the (non)recipient government by the United States. The power of American military
aid might also be framed in relation to any military support provided by other international
actors. A lack of military support for the regime from other global actors, especially during periods of conict, would signal an over-reliance on American military support to help
entrench domestic legitimacy. I also expect contrasts between American non-condemnation
and international actor's condemnation to be vital to distinguishing American military aid
as a legitimating force. By contrast, American military aid and foreign legitimacy might not
be rejected by the incumbents but rather by civil society and activists in a recipient country.
This would arise in direct opposition to discourses of national security. Opponents might
believe that incumbents will be held guilty for any future wrongs resulting from collaboration
with the United States, or even that with a loud enough resistance, incumbents will be forced
to alter their attitude towards American assistance. There are several rhetorical labels that
signal strong opposition to combined American and recipient incumbent national security
discourse: capitalist, imperialist, violation of sovereignty, extractive/neo-colonial, etc. I will
provide a more exact description of how I operationalize each discourse in the chapter on
process tracing.

1.4

Regression analysis

The rst of two methods I will implement in this analysis is an ordinary-least squares
regression analysis of global data on over 6,400 country-year cases ranging from 1976-2016.
As I noted above, there is an apparent dearth of quantitative analysis of the eects of
16
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American military aidmost analyses are qualitative accounts or summary tables. Data
analysis is an incredibly persuasive, easily-interpreted tool that may have outcomes beyond
the written contents of this thesis. The data combine several macroeconomic variables,
election and polity information, and other select control variables with their corresponding
repression scores. Summary tables will quantify the extent of this principal relationship,
while separate models will check for robustness with alternative independent and dependent
variables. A discussion of results and a comparison to the hypothesized relationship will
conclude the statistical analysis.

1.5

Process tracing

I implemented a model for process tracing analysis in order to establish the causal direction of the relationship between American military aid and repression. This involves tracing
the historical evolution of processes relevant to the development and actualization of the
three mechanisms outlined above. Each case includes a brief historical context, examination of events a decade before aid disbursement, and then the outcome of repression two
years later. I hypothesize that the impact on repression is not immediate, partially because
the disbursement is not made immediately but also because the consistency of any eect
of American military aid on repression will require some time to develop. I created three
groups encompassing zero, low, and high levels of disbursement. From these, I attempted to
control for relevant competing explanatory variablesnamely GDP per capita and conict.
Because each case was in conict when aid was disbursed, I incorporated relevant dimensions
of these conicts into my analysis, namely the context of civil war, the Cold War, and the
War on Terror. Each of these conict-related conditions aected the availability of juridical
sovereignty within the years immediately after aid was disbursed.
17

Matthews
1.6

Thesis

Thesis outline

The remainder of the thesis is organized into four chapters. Chapter 2 details the composition and regression analysis of the data, with summary tables included for the principal
independent and dependent variables. Chapter 3 summarizes process tracing in three case
studies, with independent evaluations and a cross-case comparison to the theorized causal
pathway. These cases draw directly from the three proposed causal mechanisms to demonstrate how an increase or decrease in military aid precipitated a chain of causal events leading
to a corresponding change in repression. I make note of any events or processes that support
secondary results as well. Lastly, Chapter 4 provides concluding remarks that summarize
the contributions of this thesis while reminding the reader of the limitations and areas of
improvement for this analysis.
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Chapter 2
Regression Analysis
For decades, theoretical and observational evidence has guided studies of American military aid and repression worldwide. While these anecdotal accounts may be persuasive in
particular contexts, they are not generalizable. My knowledge of political economy methods and a growing adeptness with statistical analysis led me to supplement these accounts
with an analysis of a universe of cases, in order to more thoroughly evaluate the validity
of my hypothesis. Statistical analysis can be persuasive, both for estimating how aid affects repression and isolating its impact from other related variables. Many scholars have
taken advantage of public American military aid data to summarize trends using descriptive
analysis, but few have applied it towards estimating outcomes with statistics. Presenting a
veritable estimate of this relationship is paramount to informing policy and advocacy eorts
as the United States continues to be pressured to defend its international posturing.
This chapter analyzes a dataset of US military aid, repression indexes, macroeconomic
development indicators, and a slew of additional control variables. First, I briey evaluate
the data integrity and describe how variables have been compiled into my dataset. Next, I
introduce the specic parameters of the OLS regression, and then I motivate the inclusion of
each control in my analysis. Finally, I conclude with a presentation of my results in tabular
and summary form.
19
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Data Sources

Political Terror Scale (PTS)
The principal measure of repression I will use in my analysis is the Political Terror Scale.
This dataset deals with one specic violation of human rights, the physical integrity rights of
the person. The dataset indexes political terror based a 5-level scale that quanties the level
of physical integrity rights violations, with more severe violations introduced at higher levels
(Gibney et al., 2017). Sources include yearly reports from Amnesty International, Human
Rights Watch, and United States' State Department Reports. There are several reasons why
I favor using PTS over other possible indexes, proxy variables, or any other attempt to operationalize repression. The rst is that data are the most widely available, beginning in 1976
up until 2016. CIRI, the rival measure of repression and detailed below, contained a suprising number of NAs given that it draws from the same source documents to code repression.
And lastly, PTS is, at present, the only consistently updated repression index, despite its
limitations. The principal criticism relevant for my analysis and hypothesized mechanisms is
that it assesses the human conditions of these rights, and not outright government practices
and policies. This means that non-government actors can perpetrate political terror that
will be included in that country-year's PTS score. The indicidual condition of rights also
presupposes a Western framework of human rights based on individual civila liberties. This
idea is demonstrably not as compatible in low-income and non-Western nations, where community well-being and basic individual livelihood security dominate philosophical thought
(Gyekye, 1996; Wiredu, 2004; Devji, 2008; Taylor, 2011).

Repression: Cingranelli and Richards Human Rights Data Project (CIRI)
The advantage of the CIRI is that it includes data on four types of human rights violations: 1) Physical integrity of the person encompassing freedom from torture, disappearances,
extrajudicial killings, and political imprisonment; 2) "Empowerment" rights encompassing
20
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seven separate rights: freedom of movement (domestic and foreign), speech, assembly, religion; workers' rights; and electoral self-determination; 3) Women's economic, political, and
social rights (disaggregated, unlike the above two indexes); 4) Freedom of the judiciary
(Cingranelli and Richards, 2010). What CIRI compensates for in this variety of repression
indexes is an otherwise questionable level of data integrity and utility compared to PTS. The
most important issues is that CIRI data mildly limit the degrees of freedom in my analysis,
most clearly because CIRI only covers 1976-2011. Additionally and surprisingly, the physical
integrity index is far less complete than PTS, despite identical coding sourcesState Department and HRW reports. CIRI is losing relevance in the wider repression literature, and no
updates are planned for the near future. Lastly, unlike PTS' 5-level coding scheme, CIRI
indexes and subindexes vary in how they are scored. Physical integrity is scored from 0 to
8, while empowerment rights are scored from 0 to 14 and women's rights are disaggregated.
This does not facilitate comparison between indexes within the dataset, let alone to external
indexes. The dierence between a 5 and a 6 in physical integrity might be signicant, while
it might be slight and inconsequential for empowerment rights. I will include CIRI's physical integrity and empowerment rights indexes in my analysis as a robustness check for PTS
(Cingranelli, Richards and Clay, 2014). Of the non-physical integrity violations, empowerment rights like freedom of assembly, speech, and religion are all possible evaluation points
for repression, even if universal understanding and emphasis on these rights as fundamental
human rights remains contentious.

Since the end of the Vietnam war, the United States has selectively committed combatready troops. Lost American lives and visible hostility towards American troops abroad are
equally costly as incumbents try to maintain support for the American military's strategic
vision. As aid in the form of nancial, intelligence, and hardware disbursements becomes
preferable, understanding how aid impacts political outcomesnot just security objectives
becomes paramount.
21
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US Military Aid: USAID Greenbook & SIPRI
The Greenbook covers all US economic and military assistance to countries that have
received over USD 500,000 in assistance. Assistance is broadly conceived and includes grants,
loans, equipment donations, and other miscellaneous expenditures. This dataset covers
both historic and current grant programs, and normalizes historical dollars as adjusted for
ination. Values in the original dataset are listed as a total aid gures, but I did some
modications to this variable for my analysis. The rst is that after compiling the data to
corresponding country-years, I modied any NA values to zero aid disbursed. The rationale
for this is that all aid disbursements are publicly reported to Congress, both in every proposed
budget and after the disbursement has been made. Any country that did not have an
aid disbursement listed accordingly received zero aid dollars in that year, otherwise the
disbursement would have been reported. This was a welcome conclusion after some research,
both both because listing aid as zero allowed for the largest

n possible, but also to successfully

take the natural log of this raw aid value because of the high skewnearly two thirds of
cases in the nal sample did not receive any American military aid. While this is certainly
the most comprehensive dataset for examining American military aid, contemporary aid
generally includes more intelligence and support roles than conventional guns and troops on
the ground, with few exceptions.
An additional proxy for US military aid is the Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute's Trend-Indicator Value (TIV) Export Data. TIV is a calculated sum based on the
known production cost of a particular military hardware, or a value estimate based on the
electronics, payload, year produced, level of use, and other estimation strategies. It is not
the actual nancial value of the military exchange. This is a good supplement to military
aid for two reasons: American military hardware sales have been shown to correlate with
repression, while distinguishing between American private-sector and government sales to
foreign countries is a dicult or impossible task (Klare et al., 1981), and these data are
comparable to TIV exports from other foreign sources. TIV exports are a proxy for US
22
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military aid and for the control variable of military aid from other sources.1

2.2

Sample

Approximately 6,400 country-year cases in this dataset include values for both US military aid and PTS score, beginning in 1976 and ending in 2016. The sample includes zero
values for US military aid, but not null values for PTS score. As mentioned above, this is
because disbursing zero aid dollars can be a selective choice on the part of American aid
donors. By contrast, null PTS scores usually reect a total disruption in state capacity or
otherwise unreported and therefore uncoded level of political terror in that country. Because
this analysis is interested in observable i.e. quantied repression, all NAs for PTS were excluded. As mentioned above, I used CIRI's empowerment rights index and physical integrity
index as robustness checks.

2.3

Analysis

The relationship between total military aid and level of repression
After running a bivariate analysis, I then ran an ordinary least-squares regression by
including controls related to repression. My baseline equation for estimation is as follows:

Yi = βi ∗ ln(Xi + ϕi ) + βi ∗ Ci + αi + i
Where Yi is the outcome of interest, level of repression in a given country-year, βi represents the respective coecients for each variable, Xi is the total monetary amount of military
aid received from the American government, and Ci is a vector of control variables accounting for other possible explanations of repression. ϕi is a constant of 0.001 included to correct
for zero values when taking the log of American military aid, αi is the constant and i is the
1 See the Appendix, Table 5.3 for a full description of data sources, including controls.
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error term. This regression used panel-corrected standard errors and I ran separate country
and era-xed eects. Fixed-eect results are summarized in the Appendix. I took the natural log of all skewed variables, which include many macroeconomic development indicators
and non-American military disbursements.

2.4

Controls

As I suggested in the literature review, this analysis is complicated by evidence for confounding explanatory and outcome variables. In this section, I restate the motivating factors
behind including each control and attribute each variable to its data source.
The World Bank Development Indicators form the largest group of control variables and
include population, GDP per capita, oil rents per capita, natural resource rents, foreign direct
investment as a percentage of GDP, and male youth as a percentage of total population. They
are included in my analysis to replicate the statistical analyses in related studies. Each has
been tested and correlates with repression, unrest, and/or political violence and conict in
various studies (Das, 2017; Kishi, Maggio and Raleigh, 2017; Ross, 2013; Urdal, 2006). All
data are available by country-year on the World Bank website and can be downloaded in le
forms compatible with multiple statistical software programs.
Humanitarian aid from two principal sourcesthe Development Assistance Committee
and USAIDis included as a competing explanation for repression, and as a proxy for natural
disasters and conict events. Humanitarian aid could be implemented by NGOs, in which
case state power might be threatened and repression of NGOs would result, or state power
could be weakened by a disaster; consequently, NGOS would experience less repression in
their demands to incumbents for better accountability (Apodaca, 2017; Wood and Wright,
2016). Alternatively, state actors could be the principal beneciaries of humanitarian aid.
Because of semi-regular aid cycles in the wake of frequent natural disasters, actors might
neglect to update disaster preparedness mechanisms. When a disaster does occur, aggrieved
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citizens might renew demands for state-provided security and other services. Consequently,
state actors would repress rather than acquiesce to maintain the semi-regular benets of
humanitarian aid (Apodaca, 2017). Indonesia is one example of a polity where disaster
preparedness mechanisms remain woefully non-existent or inadequate and frequent tsunamis
and volcanoes result in regular humanitarian aid provisions.
Data on national-level elections are included from the Varieties of Democracy version 8
dataset and are coded as a sum of national executive and/or legislative elections. Incumbents
may be likely to increase repression of political opposition during election seasons, as was
the case during Niger's 2016 presidential and legislative elections (Mueller and Matthews,
2016). Conict will also be controlled for using aggregated data from the Uppsala Conict
Database. These data include any conict in which the state is a principal actor. Conict is
likely to lead to repression in a manner similar to disaster, in that civil policing capacity will
be reduced and citizens are highly likely to lament or suer from government incapacity to
provide security. These conict data also partially control for the presence of foreign military
involvement within the state territory (Peksen, 2012; Pickering and Kisangani, 2014). Two
data sources from the Center for Systemic Peace are includedmajor terrorist bombings
(greater than 15 casualties) and the Polity IV regime type score. Similar to disasters or
conict, terrorist bombings strain existing state security capacities and allow dissident voices
a rallying point to lament grievances against the state.2

2 The level of ethnic homogeneity within a nation-state is sometimes correlated to the level of stability
within a country, which could be a related to the adoption of repressive policies (Homan and Zarecki,
2018). Although I recognize the literature relating ethnicity to a wide range of political outcomes, ethnolinguistic fractionalization scores do not measure the political relevancy of ethnic groups, and the ethnic
power relations dataset is an absolute rather than relative measure.

It does not allow for easy study of

the comparative evolution of ethnic relevancy between country-years (Driessen, 2008). Notwithstanding the
theoretical and empirical limitations of attempting to test ethnicity, I believe that the political relevance of
ethnicity is already included in my other controlsethnicity might result from or produce election violence,
conict, or inequality, among others. Without a strong and readily applicable theoretical justication for
including a measure of ethnicity, I acknowledge this literature and maintain focus on other controls.
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Results

Accounting for all models, the relationship between American military aid and repression
was robustly negative and statistically signicant, contrary to what I had anticipated. First,
I will summarize key ndings from the models, and then I will discuss the limitations of this
analysis. This is separate from suggesting alternative hypotheses or areas for improvement,
which will be discussed in the conclusion.3
In Table 3.1, models 1-4 report a robustly negative and signicant association between
American military aid and repression across all models. Other robust variables include population and American and DAC humanitarian aid, while countries in conict were more
likely to be repressive and countries with a higher Polity score were naturally less repressive.
While the positive association between humanitarian aid and repression may seem surprising, earlier sections noted how aid can be easily diverted by incumbents to achieve political
purposes (Apodaca, 2017). Alternatively, humanitarian aid is so frequently disbursed that
it reects a weak disaster response infrastructure that is a product of low incumbent accountability to citizens (Wood and Wright, 2016); in fact, the case study of Mozambique in
the next chapter (and many others on the African continent) demonstrates the capacity of
incumbents to siphon humanitarian aid to legitimate their rule (Newitt, 2002; Adam, 2002).
Table 3.2, models 5-8 contain robustness checks that estimate the coecient representing
the relationship between other foreign military contributions and repression. Once again,
population is a robustly positive and signicant variable. These models introduce tradeindicator value (TIV) weapons sales from a particular country to a purchasing country, a
variable drawn from UCDP's TIV search query. As mentioned above, TIV represents the
estimated value of weapons disbursed through cash sales to another country, not the actual
amount exchanged. I queried this value for the United States, Soviet Union, China, and
the same European DAC countries included in the humanitarian aid variable. Interestingly,
3 See the Appendix, Tables 5.1 and 5.2 for additional robustness checks using CIRI's physical integrity
index as the measure of repression. Overall, results were consistent with the principal models using PTS,
and they are therefore not included in the principal results section.
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although we might expect that American and Soviet weapons sales supported repressive
regimes, models 5 and 6 found no signicant association between these two TIVs and repression, and recipients of Soviet weapons were more likely to be repressive the higher their
oil rents per capita. Part of this can be attributed to a low sample size: Soviet data would
have only been available for 14 years, and unlike American military aid, direct weapons sales
by other foreign companies are not necessarily publicly disclosed. The same results held for
Chinese military assistance, which took the form of both aid and weapons exports. Worth
noting is that Chinese weapons distributors did not export to any country that had a meaningful percentage of its wealth derived from natural resource rentsChinese military support
must come with fundamentally dierent objectives. Like the Soviet Union, this sample is
also limited in size to only 12 years. Lastly, Model 8 yielded no association between military
aid from European DAC members and repression, although recipients of European weapons
were 0.015 units more repressive for each percent increase in their male population.

Country xed-eects and year eects were also recorded. Country xed-eects relates the
average level of repression in Afghanistan (the rst country in the dataset) to the average level
of repression in each respective country. The null hypothesis is that repression in another
country is signicantly dierent than average repression in Afghanistan. Of all countries,
Colombia, Iraq, KoreaPeople's Democratic Republic, South Sudan, and Sudan all had a
p-value lower than 0.001, meaning that these countries had a level of repression that was not
signicantly dierent from Afghanistanthe fact that these countries are not Afghanistan
does not entirely explain their dierent levels of repression. Year xed-eects were designed
by era, which naturally divided the years in my analysis into three groups: the Cold War,
the 1990s, and the Global War on Terror. Overall, average repression worldwide increased
with each change in era. Exact coecient results are reported in the appendix.
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ln(US mil aid)

(1)
−0.005∗∗∗
(0.001)

(2)
−0.008∗∗∗
(0.001)
0.580∗∗∗
(0.045)
−0.014
(0.013)
123.076
(76.427)
−123.072
(76.427)
0.004
(0.010)
0.008
(0.006)

(3)
−0.007∗∗∗
(0.001)
0.525∗∗∗
(0.054)
−0.014
(0.013)
109.950
(76.369)
−109.946
(76.369)
0.004
(0.010)
0.009
(0.006)
0.000∗∗∗
(0.000)
0.003
(0.004)

0.004
-0.028
6444

0.055
0.017
3531

0.059
0.021
3531

ln(Population)
ln(GDP per capita)
FDI as % of GDP
Natural resource rents
ln(Oil per capita)
Male pop ages 15-24
ln(US Hum aid)
ln(DAC Hum aid)
In conict?
Elections
Polity score
Terrorist bombings
R2
Adj. R2
Num. obs.
∗∗∗ p

< 0.01,

∗∗ p

(4)
−0.007∗∗∗
(0.002)
0.629∗∗∗
(0.062)
0.015
(0.014)
95.293
(73.765)
−95.289
(73.765)
−0.013
(0.011)
0.008
(0.007)
0.000∗∗
(0.000)
0.010∗∗
(0.004)
0.610∗∗∗
(0.038)
−0.025
(0.018)
−0.027∗∗∗
(0.003)
0.015∗
(0.008)
0.159
0.122
2909

< 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1

Table 2.1: Principal results models relating the natural log of American military aid to
aggregate PTS score. Models 2-4 include macroeconomic controls, while humanitarian aid
and then regime characteristics were included in Models 3 and 4, respectively. Several control
variables had statistically signicant results, while American military aid was signicant and
negatively associated with PTS score.
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ln(US aid)
ln(US TIV)
ln(Population)
ln(GDP per capita)
FDI as % of GDP
Natural resource rents
ln(Oil per capita)
Male pop ages 15-24

(5)
−0.005∗∗
(0.002)
−0.011
(0.011)
0.835∗∗∗
(0.080)
−0.198∗∗∗
(0.037)
−89.711
(1012.705)
89.714
(1012.705)
−0.002
(0.016)
−0.013
(0.010)

ln(USSR TIV)
ln(China TIV)
ln(China aid)
ln(DAC TIV)
R2
Adj. R2
Num. obs.
∗∗∗ p

< 0.01,

∗∗ p

0.073
0.013
1524

(6)

(7)

(8)

1.859∗∗∗
1.825∗
0.651∗∗∗
(0.425)
(0.968)
(0.053)
−0.143∗∗
−0.178
0.002
(0.070)
(0.180)
(0.018)
6010.765
0.007
−406.253
(89061.675) (0.025) (1141.423)
−6010.631
406.254
(89061.679)
(1141.423)
0.109∗
0.078
−0.007
(0.059)
(0.062)
(0.014)
0.015
0.025
0.015∗
(0.036)
(0.073)
(0.008)
0.035
(0.035)
0.005
(0.019)
−0.005
(0.033)
−0.002
(0.010)
0.130
0.134
0.079
-0.031
-0.257
0.026
252
91
2084

< 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1

Table 2.2: Secondary results relating alternate foreign military contributions to aggregate
PTS score. Each model reports a dierent foreign source: the United States, the Soviet
Union, China, and European donors. Oil per capita, GDP per capita, and male population
ages 15-24 were all signicant in at least one model.
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Discussion

These results and the accompanying robustness checks in the Appendix directly conict
with the hypothesis that more American military aid is correlated with more repression. I
will spend some time here discussing the limitations of the statistics and data available, and
then explain how process tracing analysis in the next chapter can still add nuance to these
results. The concluding chapter of the thesis will discuss possible areas for future studies
in more detail based on secondary ndings, and will incorporate examples from the process
tracing case studies.

Limitations
In discussing limitations, I nd it helpful to revisit the characteristics of the dataset and
several key variables. The data represent an entire population of country-year cases, but
analysis is limited to 41 country-years beginning in 1976. This misses key military aid years
during the Cold War, including the entirety of the Vietnam and Korean wars. Although
American military aid is consistently reported based on disbursements made through USAID, this does not include any covert aid to recipient countries. This might include CIA
intelligence, Special Operations forces and activity, or other top-secret contributions. As the
United States continues to delegate itself to primarily intelligence and support roles rather
than coordinating activities with recipient militaries, accounting for this type of support
will become more pertinent (News24, 2019). The population of cases also included most
high or medium income countries where foreign military assistance is intended to maintain
diplomatic alliances rather than unilaterally advance American security interests.
PTS remains the preferred measure of repression based on its data robustness, temporal
extent, and regular updates, but, the data has several noteworthy limitations. The most
glaring of these is the bias towards a Western i.e. liberal conception of human rights that
upholds democratic values, institutions and participation in governance at the individual
level. There are two problems with this framework for coding repression. The rst is that
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despite the assumption that strong democratic institutions prevent human rights abuses,
examples abound of Western regimes hypocritically denying human rights in their own territory and worldwide. Highly publicized examples include South-North immigration to North
America and Southern Europe, and the use of torture by the United States in detention
centers worldwide (Devji, 2008). The second problem is that polities around the world have
conceptions of human rights that dier dramatically from the individual rights framework
employed in the West. Gyekye (1996) and Wiredu (2004) note that in most Ghanaian societies, an individual's worthiness is evaluated based on how much an individual is able to
contribute to their community. This framework has been employed to devastating eect in
multi-ethnic nations like Ghana, where stereotypes allow a political majority to justify their
own mandate while excluding other minority groups from governance. The consequence of
this political process can be a diusion of targeted exclusionary acts or even violence against
minority groups, as has been the case in Rwanda, Bosnia, Myanmar, Peru and other polities
throughout the years of analysis.
Two smaller objections to the way human rights abuses are coded at present are that more
authoritarian countries and countries in conict are automatically coded as more repressive
controlling for conict and regime type is essentially redundant with the way these variables
were reported in PTS. Similarly and perhaps directly challenging to my hypothesis is the fact
that many countries that do not receive American military aid are coded as more repressive
because of the absence of political liberties in socialist and communist economic systems.
Many cases that did not receive American military aid would have been coded as highly
repressive based on the fact that their economic systems are not compatible with the Western
human rights framework mentioned above.
In relation to the statistical analysis, one key limitation is that I was not able to use
the most recent advancement in panel-corrected standard error functions within R studio.
The "pcse" function or similar versions of it in other statistical programs are now the standard for any econometric analysis, yet I was unable to debug its persistent error with my
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dataset. Similar to what the "plm" function I settled for does, "pcse" would have grouped
the "country" and "year" variables to produce an error term correcting for the likelihood
that the outcome of repression in country A in year X is related to repression in A in year
X-1. At rst, the error with this function seemed to indicate that there were cases in my
dataset that did not have any observations for "country" or "year," or that some cases had
a value for one variable but not the other. The next issue to debug seemed to require a
reference dataset that was the same length as the model, which is impossible given the fact
that degrees of freedom in a model is equal to one less than the total number of cases. After
consulting with my statistics and thesis advisor on these issues, we ultimately abandoned
use of "pcse" in favor of "plm." This solution has been described to me as "hackish," but at
present I cannot justify any long-term, likely fruitless eorts to debug "pcse."
A macro-level criticism of this statistical analysis is that its components are not nearly
advanced enough to be considered denitive. At earlier stages of my analysis, it had been
suggested that I include an instrumental variable as a causal identication strategy and
falsication tests. While I conceptualized an instrumental variable, researching and implementing it would have been at least as much work as process tracing, if not more to adjust
for the learning curve inherent in coding this in R studio or ArcGIS. I sidelined this initiative
for what I already knew and was able to work on, which was the theoretical framework and
the case selection in preparation for process tracing. My methods background is originally in
comparative historical sociology and archival research, so continuing to independently study
statistical methodology beyond simple regression analysis proved incompatible with fullling
each component of the project. There is also certainly omitted variable bias in my analysis,
but some of that can be corrected for in the next chapter on process tracing.

Moving forward: Justication for process tracing
In pre-specifying my analysis, I anticipated that process tracing would compliment statistical ndings that supported the hypothesis that more American military aid is correlated
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with more repression. The statistical results did not support this hypothesis, as coecients
for American military aid were robustly negative and signicant. With these results, one
could consider dropping the process tracing entirely; however, I believe that there is some
merit to including both despite the altered intentions of these two analyses. Process tracing
can still determine the causal direction of this relationship, even if this contribution remains
theoretical rather than directly applicable to the present statistical analysis. Another advantage of process tracing is that within small-

n analysis, I will explore a wider range of

possible control variables inuencing the repression than were controlled for in regression
analysis. Examining individual cases will investigate the degree to which they vary from the
theoretical and observed average association between American military aid and repression.
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Chapter 3
Process Tracing Analysis
Appearances can be deceiving, as was the case with the Ghanaian-American military
agreement signed in 2018. On the surface, the Ghanaian Armed Forces would receive $30
million and renovated facilities in exchange for open permissions for American troop and
equipment movement throughout the country. When opposition leaders leaked the agreement
to the public and even a year after it was signed, many viewed the agreement as permitting an
American-operated military

base. Demonstrations and a boycott of the vote on the agreement

took center-stage, but behind the scenes, a much more nefarious politics of "equalization" was
taking place (Bob-Miliar, 2018). The ruling New Patriotic Party quietly began investigations
into the supposed double salaries National Democratic Congress members received during
their incumbency, but these investigations were sidelined in exchange for opposition silence on
the military agreement (Asante, 2018). Some even speculated that the $30 million was not the
only money paid to the Ghanaian government (Ghana Web, 2018; Asante, 2018). Academic
and civilian observers dismiss the issue because of its secondary importance relative to human
security concerns, while security experts maintain that the future of Ghana's security involves
substantial assistance from the United States (Danso and Okyere, 2018; Tsegah, 2018; Kotin,
2018; Anonymous, 2018). Whichever position Ghana adopts, incumbents remain poised to
benet from growing international stature at the expense of their political opponents as
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recent and present processes result in the silencing of dissenting voices.
This chapter motivates the use of process tracing as a causal identication strategy.
Scholars who utilize process tracing provide explanations of

how an independent event came

to be while minimizing quantitative estimation or prediction of the relevancy of the processes
leading up to the event. In addition to providing a more robust explanation for an observable
implication, process tracing also attempts to conrm the causal direction of independent processes leading to the observable outcome (Schimmelfennig, 2015; Bennett and Checkel, 2015;
Mahoney, 2003). Process tracing was a necessary addition to my analysis because instances
of repression could hypothetically lead to an outcome of increased American disbursements.
Although process tracing does contradict the statistical analysis in two of my cases, this was
likely to occur with a smaller sample. Rather than contribute to the debate between large
and small-

n analyses, I focus on interpreting what I have discovered with process tracing,

separately from the statistical results. In each case, there was still observable evidence of
theoretical mechanisms and related processes leading to observable increase in repression,
regardless of the level of American military aid.

n

Process tracing is inherently a small- analysis, and combined with a one-year deadline
for completion of my research I limited myself to three representative case studies: Angola,
1997; Mozambique, 1994; and Niger, 2014. Each of these corresponds to low, medium, and
high levels of American aid disbursements, respectively. The years represent an intentional
end point for process tracing analysis. My goal is not to examine the entire evolution
of aid disbursements and observable repression (moreover, this would be a chronological
evaluation), but rather I argue that the requisite processes occurred in the years building up
to the particular country-year.
Schimmelfennig (2015) outlines several key components to conducting

ecient process

tracing. In relation to in-case analysis, he stresses that only processes that directly inuence
principal and competing theoretical or empirical mechanisms should be included. Schimmelfennig also notes that the most eective process tracing pre-species the principal causal
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mechanisms during research design, which I have done in the next section . These suggestions address three problematic tendencies of process tracing analysis: waste of resources,
the temptation of storytelling, and the lack of generalizability (Schimmelfennig, 2015; Mahoney, 2003). After introducing the intermediate mechanisms and how I intend to observe
each, I will justify my case selection and the rationale for comparing these three. I then
describe how these processes and mechanisms manifested in each case. I conclude with a
descriptive summary of ndings and compare the key similarities and dierences in each
case, accounting for as much variation as is possible, briey.

3.1

Mechanisms and Observations

As Figure 4.1 details and as theorized in Chapter 1, I hypothesized that there are three
central intermediate steps that lead American military aid to result in a change in repression.
I will reiterate each step and then summarize observable implications. First, military aid is
appropriated for civilian policing capacities. Next, juridical sovereignty is either available or
it is not. If juridical sovereignty as provided by security cooperation with the United States
or the legitimacy established through existing international partnerships is missing, then we
would expect to see that incumbents do not act on an military aid disbursement, and if they
do it is because the cost of repression remains lower than the cost of concession. The last step,
when juridical sovereignty is available, predicts whether repression increases or decreases.
Some form of resistance would be expected to challenge the discourse of national security
presented by incumbents and their American partners. With resistance, the cost of repression
would increase and we would accordingly expect incumbent concessions, while a lack of or
well-suppressed resistance would make repression less costly, leading to increasingly severe
repressive policies. Now that I have outlined the general connectivity of these mechanisms,
I will revisit the theoretical strengths and limitations of each mechanism, and I will outline
what I was examining in my review of each of the three cases.
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Figure 3.1: The proposed causal pathways through which military aid may or may not lead to an observable increase in
repression.
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Misuse of disbursements
American military aid may directly lead to repression when disbursements are instead
applied to civilian policing capacities. This could take the form of military intervention
in civilian aairs, or the application of military-grade hardware or intelligence to civilian
policing. Since the end of World War II, "national security" threats have also been internal as
the sanctity of an international system based on nation-state governance remains entrenched
(Mampilly, 2011; Bilgin, 2017). Recent examples of military intervention against internal
threats include protester casualties in Nicaragua, Israel, Cameroon, and Nigeria (Lakhani,
2018; Amnesty, 2018, 2019; Searcey and Akinwotu, 2018). While some of these actors may
not have purposed American military aid to repress, military hardware was likely acquired
from some supplier, which consequently gave the military circumstantial capacity to use
these weapons. American nancial military aid grants the spending government free choice
on how to strengthen the military, whether through increased personnel, enhanced weapons
systems, or intelligence partnerships. The United States military was heavily criticized
during the narcotics wars of the late 1990s and 2000s because this nancing unmistakably
trained and supplied militaries to conduct policing duties (Dube and Naidu, 2015). The
(non)intersection of military and policing capabilities is a central process to be examined
within each of my cases. The pathways and nal recipient of weapons systems sometimes
remain unveried and cannot be retraced once the disbursement is made (Klare et al., 1981).
And even some technology donations intended for general use could be easily repurposed to
enhance monitoring capabilities, as was the case with computer systems donations to Chile
and Bolivia in the 1970s (Klare et al., 1981).

Juridical sovereignty
In Chapter 1, I argued that American military aid does function as an extension of
juridical sovereignty, but principally it requires preexisting juridical sovereignty. A country
might have observably high levels of juridical sovereignty if it regularly welcomes or needs
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foreign intervention to stabilize its security forces; if it regularly struggles with commodity
provision to its citizens; or if its exports are deeply intertwined in some exchange relationship
with an international partnerlikely a highly unfavorable one to the country. The provision
of military aid to a country underscores a desire by incumbents to maintain or elevate
their domestic or international status (Iqbal and Starr, 2008). Security investments can
legitimate otherwise illegitimate recipient states because of a process related to the next
causal mechanism, security discourse.

Security/resistance discourse
Discourse may be produced by any number of relevant actors: sub-national, national,
regional, or international spokespersons, executives, scholars and experts, and perhaps others. Instances of American support through discourse may be transparent ("we welcome
cooperation with X government to win the hearts and minds of potential enemies"), or they
may evidently praise the goodness of an agreement, the charisma of an incumbent executive,
or otherwise publicly demonstrate a positive shift in perception towards a recipient country.
A change in incumbent support for American security cooperation may be less observable
because of apprehension about what a public alliance with the US demonstrates. Rather
than publicly accept an alliance with the United States and its corresponding regional security agenda, incumbents are likely to reframe any American partnership as necessary for
bolstering the recipient government's national security. While I found evidence of comparable incumbent discourses in two of my cases, this signicantly dwarfed its complimentary
resistance discourse.
By contrast, resistance movements propagate their own discourse that labels American
military assistance as undesireable and unwelcome. Although the exact labeling has varied over time, the general sentiment is that the United States is a global hegemonic force
and its (military) interactions with any country are intended to expand its grand strategy agenda. As stated by resistance movements, this may include anti-Muslim policies and
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military intervention, natural resource acquisition, a pro-capitalist consumer agenda, and
an unshaking desire to become/remain the world's only empire. In contrast to the limited
analysis resources for security discourse at the national level, resistance discourse may take
several dierent forms. This could include collective societies and mobilization movements,
mobilizations events such as protest, and even political opposition boycotts.

3.2

Case selection

I opted for a diverse case selection strategy to choose three representative cases, wellsummarized by Seawright and Gerring (2008). This strategy seeks to maximize analysis
along variation in either the dependent or independent variable, or along the relationship
between the two. Seawright and Gerring recommend selecting cases at natural break points
in the distribution of values. In the dataset, the independent variable (PTS score) values
are normally distributed, but the dependent variable of US military aid is quite skewed and
case counts uctuate across the whole range of values. Two natural breaks are apparent,
however: aid values greater than zero, and values greater than USD 8.88 million. Selection
within each range was dierent for all three categories. For zero values, I randomly1 selected
Angola, 1997 with an aggregate PTS score of 4. For the middle range, I selected the median
of non-zero values2 : Mozambique, 1994 with a PTS score of 3. I identied the upper range
as all values above the natural break point of USD 8.88 million, at which point the range of
values between histogram counts expands, and each count range is several hundred smaller
than counts in the medium range. The range peaks at USD 11 billion. From this range, I
randomly3 selected Niger, 2014 which received USD 9.8 million in aid and an aggregate PTS
score of 2.5. In sum, a diverse case selection strategy obliged me to classify the data using
1 I took two steps to progressively randomize selection: I rst selected a year, then a random letter of the
alphabet represented in this range (18).

2 The median of the whole dataset is still a zero-value. The mean of the dataset or the mean of non-zero

values is not preferable, because it is skewed as a result of a few dozen instances where multiple billions of
dollars were disbursed. The mean value falls above the second natural break point of 8.88 million as well.

3 Similar to the randomization process in the low range, I randomized by year and then along number of

alphabet letters represented in this range (18).
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natural breaks in the values of American military aid. Random selection within these ranges
resulted in cases of Angola, 1997, Mozambique, 1994, and Niger, 2014.

3.3

Analysis

Angola, 1997
"For these people, revolution means bringing people together and holding demonstrations,
even when not authorized, to insult, to denigrate, to cause disturbance and confusion, with
the intention of obliging the police to act and for them to be able to say there is no freedom
of expression and no respect for rights."
Angolan President José Eduardo dos Santos in a speech to the MPLA central committee

The rst two cases of Angola and Mozambique were both Portuguese colonies and therefore follow similar timelines immediately preceding the outbreak of their respective civil wars.
In the 1960s as European powers were transferring governance of African colonies to African
nationalists, Portugal refused to do so. Independence for Portugal's African colonies was
out of the question. The Portuguese economy was underdeveloped relative to its European
counterparts, and existing industry would not have survived without a forced labor regime
that was the leading policy of the Portuguese dictatorship (Chabal, 2002; Newitt, 2002).
This lead Africans under Portuguese rule to stage wars of liberation. Eventually, military
ocers in Portugal staged a coup and in 1975, all of Portugal's colonies were granted independence (MacQueen, 1997; Schmidt, 2013). At that moment, the Movimento Popular
de Libertação de Angola (MPLA ) government was in control of the capital city of Luanda
and had remained in control despite a Zairean-backed secessionist movement, two opposing
liberation movements the Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA) and União Nacional para a Indepêndencia Total de Angola (UNITA), and a South African expeditionary
force (Birmingham, 2002). The liberation movement that would be recognized as the ruling
government of Angola would be the one in control of Luanda on independence day, and
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MPLA remained in control after sustained ghting and the assistance of Cuban soldiers and
armaments (Turner, 2002).
Of course, independence did not end the hostilities between rival movements, and the
MPLA still had a South African invasion force to contend with. Once the MPLA government
was recognized by international actors, the Soviet Union was able to transport additional
Cuban troops to repel the South African invasion force (Gleijeses, 2010). After their withdrawal, South African involvement became minimal, primarily forming a training ground for
UNITA troops in Southwest Africa. The conict became a binary struggle between UNITA
and MPLA. While MPLA would occasionally best UNITA soldiers for several months at
a time, the primary victims of the war were civilians with mass casualties on either side
(Minter, 1994). Both movements were so successful in swaying civilians to their cause that
they remained loyal despite complete lapses in safety from attacks and widespread livelihood
insecurity (Pearce, 2015). War had exploited the slightest dierences in livelihood between
Angolans to produce a deep enmity that fueled the conict for nearly three decades after
independence.
The active role of the United States and Soviet Union in the Angolan conict was the
dominant factor in the failure to broker a lasting peace agreement until 2002 (MacQueen,
1997). American involvement in Angola dates back to the wars of liberation when ocial
policy remained a rather passive support for Portugal (MacQueen, 1997; Birmingham, 2002).
A brief interlude during the Kennedy administration led to support of the FNLA and rejection of MPLA requests for militar assistance, which would establish a precedent of denying
military support to MPLA throughout the following decades. After independence and the
onset of ghting between MPLA and UNITA, the United States switched its support to
UNITA in accordance with its strategic interest in opposing Soviet and Cuban support for
the MPLA. This is why Angola received zero American military aid in 1997, both because
of precedent and the backsliding into conict after a failed 1994 electoral process (Gleijeses, 2010). Much of the direct support for UNITA was done through the CIA and through
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proxy governments in South Africa and Zaire. Weapons were regularly disbursed except
for several years when the United States Congress blocked any nancing of the war in Angola until Ronald Reagan became President and had the amendment repealed (Birmingham,
2002). Soviet support peaked during the years immediately surrounding independence, but
a healthy cadre of military advisors remained until the late 1980s. Oil nanced the MPLA's
search for international weapons, diamond prots supported UNITA. Many European diamond cutters actively ignored the source of their "blood diamonds" and American oil rather
hypocritically invested in extraction in MPLA territory, thus some Americans were nancing
both sides of the conict.4
The political and economic dynamics between international actors, coupled with the
direct involvement of South Africa, all conspired to reduce the legitimacy of the MPLA but
ultimately favored its governance over UNITA. MPLA incumbents were able to persuade
Angolans through relocation and targeted propaganda that they were the true custodians of
prosperity, and that UNITA had done irreconcilable damage to the physical and psychological
infrastructure of the Angolan nation (Pearce, 2015). This campaign culminated with the
death of UNITA party leader Jonas Savimbi in 2002 and subsequent negotiations for peace
led by and for Angola's elites (MacQueen, 1997). The failure of the earlier Bicesse and Lusaka
peace agreements, coupled with a haphazard international presence during the contested
and inconclusive elections of 1994, served as justication enough for the Angolan elites to
collaborate on a peace agreement although it overwhelmingly favored MPLA incumbents
(Turner, 2002). Peace on MPLA terms was the nal nail in the con of the eort to
legitimize a unitary Angolaa process of actualization that was and remains by any means
necessary.
Since the 2002 Peace Agreement, opposition activists and parties have implemented dis4 This is not to say that international commodities trade was the sole motivating consideration for elites in
both movements. Billon (2001) notes that while diamonds and oil remained big-ticket items in the political
economy of war, everyday commodity provisionincluding securitykept civilians loyal on both sides of the
battleeld.

Through mobilization of identities in Angola and some semblance of goods provision, Billon

(2001) eectively argues that civilians under each movement felt that their interests were more likely to be
protected by staying where they were (Mampilly, 2011; Pearce, 2015).
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courses of resistance to challenge MPLA's policy shortcomings and its sustained claims to
be the sole representative of the Angolan people (Pearce, 2015). Part of this resistance has
come with the sustained repression of UNITA as an opposition political party, but some of it
remembers the civil war and the lack of elite concern for rural and displaced Angolans within
and outside of the country. The MPLA goverment also justies much of its legitimacy and
policy decisions by returning to the civil war. In an eort to combat public dissent, incumbents and security forces has returned to the old moniker of

confusão, a wartime euphemism

for violence that now carries more sinister connotations than its English translation of confusion. Essentially, the MPLA has and continues to employ discourse to blur the line between
a protest and a security threat to political and social order. The continual references to the
war and the MPLA victory provided sustained grounds for dismantling the legitimacy of
any non-MPLA political and social forces. It was the MPLA that secured peace through
an accepted imposition of its vision for a unitary Angola, and any challengers to this status
quo were equated with the violent warmongers who challenged MPLA legitimacy for many
decades.
Although no American military aid was disbursed in 1997, there were clear explanations
for this in Cold War dynamics and internal desires for peacekeeping. The United States
simply had no interest in supporting a former proxy of the Soviet Union and had hedged
its bets on the victory of UNITA. With the collapse of apartheid South Africa and Zaire
in the late 1990s, the United States lost its two proxies to UNITA. American policymakers
naturally avoided direct, bilateral contributions to a dying war after a failed peace agreement
that they had helped broker. However, the lack of disbursement did not exclude the MPLA
from adopting a more repressive agenda in later years.
Although juridical sovereignty had not been aorded to Angolan incumbents

vis-à-vis the

United States, they still opted to repress because the cost of repression was far cheaper than
concession (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006). During the civil war, the cost of concession was
the mandate to rule and all the associated benets of statehood (Allina, 2012; Mampilly,
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2011; Englebert, 2009; Jackson and Rosberg, 1982). Once UNITA's wartime capacity had
been suciently exhausted and the war concluded on MPLA's terms, there was nothing for
incumbents to concede. They had rightfully won the right of governance and eliminated their
most serious threat. The reason incumbents in Angola continued to repress dissenting voices
relates to a need for a balance of in/security (Bilgin, 2017; Woldemariam, 2018). Without
any form of insecurity to the nation, incumbents would be exposed as unaccountable to
their citizens in terms of goods provision. The security discourse in Angola allowed the
government unrestrained use of repression in order to protect a newly conrmed national
identityand the security of their own rule, of course (Pearce, 2015; Sankaran, 1999).

Mozambique, 1994
Like Angola, Mozambique also fought a long and protracted war of liberation with Portugal that transitioned into civil war after independence. To facilitate comparison between
these two similar cases, and to understand the eect of a modest American military aid disbursement, I will touch on how the two conicts diered in three crucial respects: in-ghting
of liberation movements; external actor participation; and natural resource endowments.
The Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO) was conceived of as a socialist
movement and was therefore comparable to MPLA in its liberation ideology. It was not
nearly as forceful a test to Portuguese control as the three-faction war in Angola, and lacked
strong support throughout much of the rural countryside (Newitt, 2002). Because independence was a result of the coup in the metropole and not political or military victory
against rival liberation movements, FRELIMO lacked total legitimacy from the beginning
of its post-independence existence. Moreover, international actors in addition had conspired
to fund a branch of the Rhodesian Special Forces to undermine FRELIMO's eort to lead
the Mozambican state. This group would remain highly militarized, numbering in the tens
of thousands and maintained a consistent supply of arms throughout the war (Gehrke, 1991;
Finnegan, 1992); after independence it became the Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RE46
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NAMO) and aspired to displace FRELIMO on account of its failure to fully incorporate the
rural masses into the liberation struggle. War after the conclusion of the post-independence
war was similarly inevitable in Mozambique as it was in Angola, due to global, regional, and
historical factors (Funada-Classen, 2013).
South Africa was again involved in the civil war of its other Lusophone neighbor, this time
exclusively as a supply source for RENAMO. Until the defeat of Rhodesia and the formation
of Zimbabwe, South Africa was able to supply RENAMO with tools and directives of war.
One of these initiatives was a targeted guerrilla campaign against the major transportation
and communications networks of FRELIMO, which further isolated FRELIMO's base in
the south of the country from its hinterlands in the north and central regionsRENAMO
was able to freely operate throughout these areas throughout the war. Apart from South
African supplies for RENAMO, the Armed Forces did not invade Mozambique as they did in
Angola. This was partially a consequence of FRELIMO's negotiable position on apartheid
rule in South Africa. Although initially publicly supportive of the African National Congress
(ANC), RENAMO's successful guerrilla campaign left Mozambique no choice but to maintain
direct economic ties with South Africa's apartheid regime for import and export purposes
(Newitt, 2002).
Like in Angola as well, American strategists developed their policy positions based on
opposition to communist hegemony in the country and region. A weak narrative constructed
Mozambique as another "domino" that had already fallen to communism because of FRELIMO's ideology and lack of a viable anti-communist challenger (Costigliola, 2010; Minter,
1994; Chabal, 1992). Moreover, there was no consistent and substantial support from the
Soviet Union or Cuba like in Angolamost of the international support from fellow communist countries came from other Eastern Bloc nations or China. FRELIMO was also
well-connected to Western particularly Nordic countries because of a supply of humanitarian aid during the war of independence (Schmidt, 2013; Gehrke, 1991), and actively sought
a balance of relations with the East and West after independence. Evidence of this bal47
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ance took place even with the United States, which periodically donated non-military aid to
the FRELIMO government and resisted right-wing pressure from within its government to
supply RENAMO. Presidents Reagan and Chissano met in 1987 and reportedly got along
amicably, leading to the largest disbursement yet of American aid to Mozambique (Newitt,
2002). When the Soviet Union collapsed the already weak description of Mozambique as
another domino that had fallen to socialism was nally revoked. This further permitted
American assistance towards Mozambique despite its socialist origins, as these were already
weakening in the face of substantial humanitarian need and low levels of ideological diusion
into the countryside (Honwana, 2002).
Neither FRELIMO nor RENAMO had access to consistent or substantial natural resource
endowments or international support. FRELIMO demanded a

supply of oil as a consequence

of successful RENAMO eorts to cut oil pipelines and major supply lanes apart from South
Africa (Finnegan, 1992). Financing of either side was at the behest of a few generous
donors. As a result, both sides sought to maximize the utility of civilian support to their
cause. RENAMO recruitment was conveyed as anti-FRELIMO politics that actually favored
rural interests, even if what rural Mozambicans wanted anecdotally was to be left alone
after centuries of conict with the Portuguese and now other Mozambicans (Finnegan, 1992;
Geray, 1990). Conversely, FRELIMO cut its losses with the socialist program and began to
appeal to calls of modernization. Its position as the only internationally legitimate political
entity allowed it to oer impressive incentives to urbanites seeking to escape rather than
reform their rural livelihoods (della Rocca, 1998; Newitt, 2002). But the greatest consequence
of few natural resources was the utter destitution that both sides had reached in the early
1990s, when drought and famine left both groups unable to ght anymore (Gehrke, 1991).
With the recognition that neither side would ever garner the resources, international support,
or domestic legitimacy to govern Mozambique alone, a diplomatic solution was proposed.
Although a United Nations peacekeeping supervisory force in Mozambique monitored
the transition to peace, it was fatigue combined with RENAMO's desires for internationally
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recognized political legitimacy that allowed for a successful peace agreement (della Rocca,
1998). RENAMO leader Dhlakama came in second place in executive elections, but in the
national assembly the replicated result meant that RENAMO was a powerful and only slight
political minority (Newitt, 2002). Unlike Savimbi in Mozambique, Dhlakama was obliged
to accept the election results due to international pressure and exhaustion, and he was
more psychologically prepared to do so than Savimbi. The United Nations had learned a
lesson about the consequences of minimally supervised elections in Angola, and accordingly
supplied ample election monitors and peacekeepers to Mozambique (Honwana, 2002). The
combined increased international recognition, sharing of resources, and joint agenda for a
peaceful Mozambique brought collective relief as the country never regressed into partisan
violence.
RENAMO's contentious and military origins excluded the possibility that it alone could
govern Mozambique after a military victory (Newitt, 2002). But because it challenged FRELIMO in an apolitical manner, the response required the use of force for FRELIMO's edgling
government. Without denitive diplomatic direction or strong international support, force
in response to RENAMO was the only viable option to immediately addressing the chaos
created by the disruption in transportation and communications networks. This had the
eect of reducing FRELIMO's legitimacy which then allowed RENAMO leaders time to establish an insurgent political agenda that would contribute to and challenge FRELIMO's
national project. Strong support for RENAMO existed throughout the rural countryside as
a result of FRELIMO's empty promises of well-being through socialism for all Mozambicans,
a policy of "villagization", and FRELIMO distrust of traditional authority as conspirators
with the Portuguese throughout the war of independence (Geray, 1990). Rumors existed
of re-education camps that only a few anthropologists had any evidence of (Geray, 1990;
Minter, 1994; Finnegan, 1992), and these only added to the allure of RENAMO as a force
of liberation from FRELIMO's failed eorts at socialist unication.
Although a modest amount of American military aid was disbursed to Mozambique,
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it was not until elections were promised and a comprehensive international eort to bring
about peace that military support was provided. This may have been the consequence of
an eort to legitimate a potentially unied Mozambican military, but it may also have been
in preparation of any electoral violence if Dhlakama and RENAMO rejected the election
results. Aid was likely related to Cissano's newly formed relations with the United States
and a hastily formed pro-FRELIMO direction for President Bush's government. In any case,
there was no observable trend towards repression after the disbursement occurred. This is
largely because of the timing as Mozambique was already halfway to peace, but also because
of a lack of juridical sovereignty or resources to continue repression. The process from aid
disbursement to repression followed the theoretical pathway without juridical sovereignty,
and FRELIMO incumbents were exhausted to the point where they had to concede to
RENAMO claims to political power. Continuing to ght the war was not only more costly,
it was outright impossible given the lack of international support for a military victory,
domestic legitimacy, and resources of war. Concession and co-opting of opposition elites
may have actually legitimated FRELIMO more than any appeals to military victory would
have (Allina, 2012; Mampilly, 2011; Englebert, 2009).

Niger, 2014
Distinct from Angola and Mozambique temporally, spatially, and colonially, Niger 2014
also presents itself as the only aid recipient where the security discourse mechanism also became applicable. Niger was a former French colony and like most other Francophone African
nations it was subject to regular interventions from its former colonizer (Chafer, 2002). Generally, these interventions were in opposition to expanding Anglophone or Arabic inuences,
or to otherwise protect friendly regimes from internal threats. Research on Francophone
Africa has noted that the successful creation of a French sphere of inuence immediately
after "independence" in its former colonies elevated the likelihood that they would remain
welcoming of foreign assistance and intervention for decades (Schmidt, 2013; van Walraven,
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2013). Since independence, Niger has regularly alternated between unsuccessful eorts at
civilian rule and military dictatorship. As recently as 2010, a coup was staged against lame
duck President Tandja, who refused to back down from his eorts to pass a referendum
allowing him to modify the constitution to serve a third term (Idrissa and Decalo, 2012).
Apart from an inconsistent eort to balance civilian and military governance, the strongest
demonstration of Nigerien legitimacy is the government's eorts to regulate the practice of
Islam. In 2013 the Nigerien government announced that it would transfer supervision of
Islamic clerics, mosques, and buildings from one national Islamic council to a new, separate
council that was created with the explicit purpose to support Islam in line with the national
culture of Niger (Elischer, 2015). The context for this control was an increase in violent
incidents between Sala and Su Islamic groups in cities throughout Niger. Imams used
radio programming and Friday mosque services to portray Su elements as incompatible
with Islam and Niger as a whole, so a system was established to issue and revoke prayer
licenses. Beyond this, the government under President Tandja also began to appraise the
content of Mosque services, deployed state forces against radical Islamic elements in urban
centers, and heavily restricted the creation of any new Islamic associations. Few other countries on the African continent have stuck such a widely accepted balance between professed
religiosity and a high level of regulation of the practice of religion (Elischer, 2015). This also
has the added benet of creating a natural cooperation between incumbents and a strong
non-political ally that can be used to deect civil society challenges to state. For example,
in protests against a proposed nance law, these same Islamist organizations supervised by
the state called for a return to "serenity" and labeled the protests as "antisocial politics."
(Elischer and Mueller, 2017).
Several recent events or persistent conditions have endowed Niger's incumbents with
substantial juridical sovereignty. In addition to a history of French intervention and unpredictable domestic political events, Niger benets immensely from any foreign investment
because it is consistently one of the poorest countries on earthin 2014, Niger had the eighth
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smallest GDP per capita in the world at under $430 per person. Its uranium mines provide
one third of the fuel necessary for French nuclear reactors and as of about 2008 the country
began to receive consistent nancing, training, and troop support from the Pentagon (Idrissa
and Decalo, 2012). These are the two largest external revenue sources for Nigerien, and incumbents are therefore tied to any conditions associated with this international investment.
Purely symbolic "transfers" of support in the form of validation of elections and visits by
state ocials and top generals are especially eective in Niger and for any regime complicit
with American security agendas (Paull, 1982; Keenan, 2009; Englebert, 2009).
The context for millions of dollars of American military aid to Niger is the global war on
terror (GWOT). Although the original "war on terror" began under President Reagan as an
eort to combat Soviet-inspired political movements, the new war on terror has been explicitly directed at radical Islamist militancy. In the African context, the focus has transitioned
from recruitment to terrorist cells in the Middle East and Southeast Asia to active mobilization within African countries (Lake and Whitman, 2006). Niger has consistently been at risk
of challenges across its territory, not just from the likes of Boko Haram along the southern
border with Niger, but deep in the Sahara where al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
has operated against civilians and armed forces of Niger, Libya, Algeria, and Mali (Chafer,
2002; Abdulla, 2009). These destabilizing and potentially deligitimizing forces, coupled with
the reliance on France for economic support and the recent alliance with the United States,
have made Nigerien incumbents quite disposed to international legitimacy in the face of
faltering or non-existent domestic legitimacy (Mueller and Matthews, 2016).
The disbursement of American military aid in 2012 and matched PTS score of 2.5 in 2014
is closely connected with uncertainty and a search for stability in President Issoufou's new
civilian government. The rst major security test came in 2011, when the Nigerien military
successfully prevented heavily armed militants from entering Niger after their brief stint as
mercenaries in a chaotic Libya (Abdulla, 2009). This would have created a major power
struggle, as manifested in Mali. Armed separatists empowered splinter Islamic groups and
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without a rapid response from the French military, the Malian government and army would
have collapsed entirely. The Nigerien army was slightly more prepared for a conict, but
thanks to its initial eorts to secure its northern border it avoided a similar calamity. Since
then, collaboration with American and French soldiers on reconnaissance and patrol missions
has led the Issoufou administration dene stability as alignment of its national security
agenda with the broad American regional agenda. And in return, Issoufou's government
began to receive what Keenan (2009) refers to as "terrorism rents"a pretext to shutter any
forms of opposition civil society and to continue to receive (military) aid for as long as a
credible terrorist presence exists (Elischer and Mueller, 2017).
Just a few years into American wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, defense strategists developed an implausible theory of how terrorists from Afghanistan had traveled rst to East
Africa and then the Sahel region bordering coastal West Africa and the Sahara desert
(Keenan, 2009). This theory, the kidnapping of several tourists in the Algerian desert
(kidnappings possibly orchestrated by

Algerian special forces), public Defense Department

desires for expansion of military programs in Africa, and a supposed agenda of "new imperialism" bent on strategically winning a new Scramble for Africa for the lion's share of
the continent's natural resource wealth collectively led to a decade-long escalation of the
American military presence across the Sahel and into Niger (Lake and Whitman, 2006).
Resistance to this American "invasion" was directly associated with increased militarism
throughout the region. This was a defensive rather than oensive reaction, precisely because governments across the Sahel and into Niger continue to discriminate against pastoral,
nomadic, and smuggling-based lifestyles (Idrissa and Decalo, 2012; Keenan, 2009; Abdulla,
2009). AFRICOM operations in the early 2000s and the growing publicity of the supposedly
wide extent of the Islamic militancies successfully lead to a sense of insecurity throughout
the region (Keenan, 2009), which allows the collaborative relationship between the American
military and Sahelian governments to continue unabated.
Despite recent downscaling of the American Armed Forces presence in Niger, the eect
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of concentrated aid in the late 2000s and early 2010s has supported a consistently high level
of repression. The drone base has been completed and is now operated and maintained by
the CIA, and a major operations center in the south of the country has been gifted to the
Nigerien Armed Forces (News24, 2019). American troops on the ground have been reduced
in favor of intelligence and Special Operations forces, especially after the ill-prepared and
botched Tongo-Tongo raid resulted in four American casualties (Cooper, Gibbons-Ne and
Schmitt, 2018). Increasing gifts of intelligence have not necessarily correlated with rapid
learning or easy implementation of American-backed technology, as is frequently the case
with advanced surveillance technology (Göpfert, 2016). The promotion of the partnership
with Niger has already had a lasting eect on repression in the years immediately after
2014. Niger is now one of the more active members of the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS) in joint security operations, whether against Boko Haram or
AQIM. This has led to more reliance on Nigerien Armed Forces rather than partners in
Mali, Nigeria, and Chad. Domestically, Issoufou has also been able to consolidate power and
repress opposition without a ripple of international backlash. Hama Amadou, the leading
opposition candidate in the 2016 elections, was detained for the entirety of the 2016 elections
and opposition protests against Issoufou's security agenda were violently disrupted, resulting
in civilian casualties on several occasions (Mueller and Matthews, 2016). The United States
and France called the reelection results free and fair, despite the opposition casualties and
election irregularities.
Niger is heavily endowed with both American military aid and juridical sovereignty. More
importantly, Issoufou and Tandja's calls for increased national security

vis-à-vis increased

foreign military investment have resoundingly triumphed over any opposition discourse for
an independent and self-sustaining Niger. This includes both opposition to the American
"invasion," but also sustained yet quiet opposition to French economic hegemony over Niger's
mineral wealth. While the country's PTS score remained low in 2014 relative to previous
years, it spiked in the build-up to the 2016 elections with Amadou's arrest and the use of
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lethal weapons against non-violent civilians. These increasingly repressive acts have not merited any reconsideration of additional military support for Issoufou's administration, as his
country received tens of millions of military aid each year since his election. With increased
American opposition to the deployment of troops on the ground, aid might actually increase
in the coming years. The consequences of this uncritical support could be devastating, both
for Issoufou or other politician's ambitions for political power and for civilians attempting
to supplant the security discourse their leaders relentlessly advance.

3.4

Conclusion

Across the three cases, I discovered that each had a dierent observable amount of repression despite some basic similarities. Each case occurred after the Cold War, was a former
colony on the African continent, and was in conict two years after aid was disbursed and
the same year a PTS score was assigned. Angola and Mozambique's decolonization story and
progression into civil conict bare marked similarities to each other, while Niger's history
of French intervention and a cycle of coups and civilian governance resembles similar stories
throughout Francophone Africa and invites additional case-study testing.
Regardless of the fact that the American military aid had distributed zero dollars to
MPLAthe otherwise internationally recognized government of Angolasome juridical sovereignty
had been provided by a combination of Cuban soldiers, Soviet military aid, recognition by
the OAU, and oil investors. In fact, while these actors were supplying the Angolan government with international recognition, the United States maintained support for its wartime
opponent UNITA through its regional proxies. The collapse of apartheid South Africa and
Mobutu's Zaire in the late 1990s resulted in an increasingly desperate war by UNITA. After
Jonas Savimbi died in battle, UNITA leadership had little choice but to concede that the
movement was defeated. This peace process occurred after the cuto study year of 1997,
but because of the MPLA's control of the state and international legitimacy it never truly
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established accountability for the civilians in its territoryapart from security. This had
dire consequences as incumbents in the MPLA party maintained that most political dissent (

confusão ) was equatable to wartime guerrilla violence. In the years immediately after

1997 and the 2002 peace, few had the audacity to challenge the MPLA's deeply repressive,
anti-UNITA rhetoric and rule.
The case of Mozambique was similar to Angola in terms of historical build-up to a civil war
between self-proclaimed socialist and anti-socialist movements and a peace eort after the
end of the Cold War. I identied three key areas of dierence from Angola apparent throughout the conict: in-ghting between liberation movements, international actor participation,
and lack of natural resources. Without a decisive military victory over competing liberation
movements, the FRELIMO government did not immediately warrant strong consideration
for international support. Its strongest aid donors were humanitarian and infrastructural
aid from Nordic countries and China, donors supportive of Mozambique's non-aligned position throughout the Cold War dynamic. Ultimately, it was the lack of natural resources
that forced FRELIMO and RENAMO to reconcile with each other once they had reached
total destitution. A successful UN peacekeeping mission temporarily reduced FRELIMO's
sovereignty while inviting RENAMO into the political scene, but the outcome of the elections in favor of Chissano and FRELIMO combined with Dhlakama's acceptance of electoral
defeat created the conditions for lasting peace. The bulk of the repression in Mozambique
had occurred before American military aid was disbursed, but it coincided with pending
elections and improved relations between Mozambican and American Presidents rather than
as an eort to end the civil war in FRELIMO's favor. Whether aid was disbursed with the
promise of unication or the possibility of post-electoral violence remains unclear, but in any
case it was preventative, insignicant, and unassociated with repression after the successful
peace process.
In Niger, a substantial disbursement of American military aid followed several successive
years of disbursements and direct support for President Issoufou's stance as an American ally
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in the war on terror. Nigerien incumbents had been highly receptive of any international
investment in their country for decades, as empirical sovereignty remained minimal and
French decolonization eorts had left Niger available to foreign intervention and support of
friendly regimes. To justify his increasingly repressive stance towards political and civilian
opposition, President Issoufou maintained that the American agenda for regional security was
parallel to Niger's national security interests. This rhetoric resoundingly rejected Nigerien
commodity and electoral-based protests in 2014 and in the build-up to the 2016 elections,
and the result was often violent clashes with non-violent protests and seemingly unlawful
detention of political opponents. Repression denitively increased after Issoufou justied
its implementation in the interest of national security. Meanwhile, American donors kept
writing checks and looking the other way with the Nigerien security force's human rights
record. Their endowed support for Issoufou leaves an entire toolkit of repressive options
available for use.
Cumulatively, these three cases reached two separate outcomes in the proposed causal
pathway, despite the absence of American military aid in Angola (Figure 3.1). Substantive
documentation of the processes leading to various incumbent decisions left little room for
ambiguity or bias towards a desirable interpretation of the dierent causal pathways. The
Angolan and Mozambican civil wars are two of the most well-studied on the continent, both
because of their duration and the high level of atrocities committed against civilians. And
Niger, apart from being an iconic case of American counterterrorist involvement in Africa,
has been a personal interest for over three yearsI remain well-informed of the characteristics
and events of Issoufou's presidency. Again, the evaluation of these cases was not intended to
intentionally validate multiple causal pathways in varied outcomes of repression, but rather to
establish that in none of the cases American military aid was the outcome of an incumbent's
use of repression. Angola presented the possibility that legitimacy by other means could
result in increased repression, Mozambique demonstrated that American military aid can be
unaliated with repression, and Niger demonstrates that security discourse by incumbents
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combined with the necessary weapons and international support can lead to a public increase
in repression.
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Chapter 4
Conclusion
I would be remiss to not recognize that the most important methodological contribution
to this analysis was a pilot research trip to Ghana that inspired the entire project, and
the results of which I have referred to periodically throughout this work. The practice
of conducting on-the-ground eld research was immensely rewarding and yielded a more
nuanced understanding of phenomena that I could have researched from afar. Social scientists
studying the African continent are notoriously content with rarely or never visiting the
locales they claim to be "experts" on. I wanted to break with this convention, both for the
betterment of the present research and to position myself as ideologically committed to a
more personal practice of African Studies in the future. However, I intentionally minimized
the inclusion of these ndingsselecting the Ghanaian case not only would have biased my
results, but it would have made for a less holistic growth in my research capacity. The
methodological contribution of the interview process was essentially to discourage cherrypicking cases and to keep my perspective and motivations at the center of my research,
regardless of whether or not the evidence supported my normative concerns for increased
American military involvement in Ghana and West Africa more broadly.
I have argued that a mixed-methods approach was necessary to oer preliminary results
testing the relationship between American military aid and repression. I noted a lack of
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quantitative estimates or causal inference about how these two variables might be related.
Based on a theoretical framework utilizing the mechanisms of misuse of military aid, juridical sovereignty, and security discourse, I hypothesized that more American military aid
would be associated with more repression. To test this hypothesis, I conducted regression
analysis of a compiled dataset of American military aid, humanitarian aid, macroeconomic
indicators, foreign weapons sales, repression indexes, and other controls. After compiling
results in several models and conducting robustness checks, there was robustly negative and
statistically signicant relationship between American military aid and repression, directly
challenging my hypothesis. One possible explanation for this discrepancy is that American
military aid generally is limited in the number of international pariahs it supports. Another
possibility is that reported American military aid has decreased as time has progressed, and
that covert and Special operations are more detrimental to domestic opposition and supportive of incumbent legitimacy. Lastly, the analysis point may be too far removed from
what actually matters: the availability of juridical sovereignty and an accompanying struggle
between dierent domestic discourses. In future analyses, indexes that measure the availability of juridical sovereignty and the prominence of security discourse would be invaluable
to understanding the interaction with an aid disbursement.
I then continued with my intended plans to comparatively analyze three cases representative of the spectrum of American military aidAngola, 1997; Mozambique, 1994; and
Niger, 2014. These three cases were similar because of their low GDP per capita at the
time of disbursement, conict, and all randomly happened to be former colonies on the
African continent. Using the same theoretical mechanisms and after identifying plausible
pathways from aid disbursement to an observable change in repression, I researched relevant
historical processes leading up to aid disbursement in each of these countries. I determined
that Angola's lack of American military aid did not stop its incumbents from implementing
repressive policies, because it still held juridical sovereignty with the recognition that its
liberation movement faction had won the war for independence. The Soviet Union and OAU
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were two major supporters of the MPLA government, but oil companies also had a stake
in legitimating MPLA and its wartime practices. Mozambique's incumbents received some
military aid but did not alter their repressive stance because aid was disbursed during the
peacemaking process. Moreover, Mozambique was a recipient of multinational nancial and
humanitarian aid, not military tied up in a Cold War power struggle like the civil war in
Angola. Without juridical sovereignty and after years of psychological and nancial exhaustion, repression would have been immensely costly and nearly impossible to justify because
an outright military victory seemed impossible. Lastly, in Niger an extended history of juridical sovereignty left the country open to American payments in the form of "terrorism
rents" that have directly nanced President Issoufou's capacity to repress and win elections.
The United States and France symbolically transferred legitimacy to President Issoufou by
describing the 2016 elections as free and fair despite irregularities, violence, and detention of
leading opposition gures. They have praised Issoufou as a savvy statesman and the Nigerien military as a powerhouse in regional counerterrorism initiatives. This praise enabled
Issoufou to state that national security interests would be indenitely tied up in American
and international security interests, and any dissidents would be opposing a multinational
counterterrorist cohort. These three cases represent two of the four proposed causal pathways
I designed in my theoretical framework.
Although the quantitative results seemed to disprove the theoretical framework I had
initially posited, there are several limitations to this analysis. One possible limitation is that
I am lacking an interaction between two variablesmilitary aid disbursement and juridical
sovereignty. The United States may provide military aid, but without a representation of
how responsive each country is to external rather than internal legitimacy I have not yet fully
represented the observable and presently quantiable phenomena in my study. It has been
suggested to me to see if there is a way to operationalize Bill Easterly's data on declassied
CIA interventions, which may not be relevant for the timespan of this analysis but could be
included in a revisionary analysis. Other data limitations included correcting for the error
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produced by analyzing a panel of data: a fundamental principle of statistical analysis is
that all observations are independent of each other, but each country may relate to itself in
previous years. The newly vetted panel-correction function in R studio did not function with
my dataset, so I settled for an alternative that produced a less accurate error term. Lastly, I
noted some reporting issues in the principal measure of repression PTS, and that throughout
my analysis, my data were restricted to sovereign nation-states and not insurgent, non-state
political entities.
The principal limitation of process-tracing is that I was not able to fully maximize my
archival research methods by combing through records of the cases that I did study. These
records would have provided much more detail on anecdotes of misuse of American military aid and the discourses being employed by incumbents and opponents in the years after
American military aid was disbursed. The cases I did select were grouped into like cases,
but although they controlled for important commonalities their universality is questionable.
Studying three cases on the African continent unintentionally put me in a tough position
to defend the representativeness of my analysis. Luckily, the disparate results for dierent
amounts of aid collectively supported the causality that I proposed wherein American military aid precedes repression. Even in Angola and Mozambique where American aid was not
associated with repression, juridical sovereignty by other means lead to MPLA to repress
after peace in Angola, and repression had concluded with the war in Mozambique by the

n

time American aid was disbursed. Although process tracing necessitates a small- analysis
to facilitate comparison, I would have preferred to analyze four cases at a minimum, but due
to time constraints this was not possible.
Based on the statistical results and the political economy focus of the present study, the
most salient area for future study is that of humanitarian aid. Wood and Wright (2016)
and Apodaca (2017) have already noted a signicant association between humanitarian aid
in the event of natural disaster, but analysis seems to become readily more complicated in
conict zones. In Mozambique for example, humanitarian aid did not result in a wider spiral
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into conict, but during the same time period as the Mozambique peacekeeping mission,
conict persisted in Somalia despite a major UN humanitarian and peacekeeping initiative
(Honwana, 2002; Adam, 2002). Part of this may be that because during conict, aid provision
may never be completely partial. The causality of the relationship between humanitarian aid
and repression remains somewhat unclear and would require a dierent causal identication
strategy to resolve its own endogeneity problem. Without establishing causality, my analysis
and the statistically signicant positive association found between humanitarian aid and
repression has contributed to existing empirical accounts of the capacity of incumbents to
manipulate well-intentioned humanitarian aid donors into receipt and therefore control of
aid. Humanitarian aid remains understudied and few authors have attempted to analyze
a universe of aid recipient cases or even a sample of them. Any future analysis of aid will
encounter the same limitation I did, which is that outside of public reporting by USAID,
humanitarian aid from European and Chinese donors remains spottily consistent at best.
Another possible extension for future studies is investigation into growing military and
development aid battles between the United States and China on the African continent (Bi,
2011). These confrontations and new spheres of inuence have been referred to as a new
Scramble for Africa, or even a new Cold War. Eorts at evaluating Chinese aid worldwide
like the Global Chinese Finance Dataset are crucial to more thoroughly criticizing these
international dynamics. This dataset does include all known forms of developmental assistance by country-year, therefore one could include Chinese developmental aid in comparison
to these results. Many have already noted how this may be worthwhile precisely because developmental aid can endow incumbents with increased domestic legitimacy, and with China
being the leading development investor Chinese disbursements may have a higher impact
than disbursements from other donors (Zhang, 2011). In Niger and throughout West Africa,
many oppose the increased risks associated with a greater American military presence, but
many more oppose Chinese investments in their country's development as a precursor to
commercial development (Kotin, 2018; Bob-Miliar, 2018). Limited African trust stems from
63

Matthews

Thesis

an ambiguous understanding of whether China's intentions in international trade and diplomacy will benet or exploit developing countries.
Some studies suggest that China's ability to procure investment deals with international
pariahs may actually

reduce repression in the long-term (Kleine-Ahlbrandt and Small, 2008).

In fact, China was one of the only countries able to apply diplomatic pressure on Sudan and
Zimbabwe in the mid-2000s, but it primarily did so to maintain positive relations with
Western powers while staying true to its geo-economic plans for investment, development,
and extraction, particularly on the African continent (Zhao, 2011). The Chinese conception
of human rights is also distinct from Western human rights, in that it guarantees the provision
of basic rightsfood, shelter, economic development, and security (Taylor, 2011). Sovereignty
is referred to as a "guarantor" of human rights, but not civil liberties within that sovereign
nation. China's approach to human rights is undoubtedly more compatible with African
philosophical thought, both in relation to the importance placed on community and the
deprioritization of civil liberties in favor of basic security (Gyekye, 1996; Wiredu, 2004;
Taylor, 2011). This may lead incumbents in "quasi-states" on the African continent to
maintain their clientelistic networks and simply change funding sources to China, forming
a wider net of developing nations supporting and investing in each other Jackson (1987);
Taylor (2011).
With ambiguous understandings about the intentions of any foreign involvement on the
African continent comes a pertinent need to evaluate all international partnershipsincluding
American military aid, international humanitarian aid, and Chinese developmentremain
transparent, and serve as many in need as possible. As evidenced by the disparate understandings of humanity between Western, Islamic, Chinese, and African philosophical thought,
growing divisions create a growing need to reset and attempt to understand our dierences
(Devji, 2008; Taylor, 2011; Gyekye, 1996; Ibhawoh, 2017; Bilgin, 2017). With my analysis, I
intended to fulll as many of these objectives as possible while following best social science
practices. Although my statistical results do not condemn American military involvement,
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support for my theoretical framework after process tracing analysis may contribute to generalizable understandings of how to interrupt the processes leading to repression, a process that
implicates many interconnected international actors (Young, 2006). Seemingly disparate understandings of human rights abuses may intersect, or better their dierences might produce
dialogue and learning that moves us away from animosity and closer to peaceful coexistence,
one that does not require any American military aid at all. Regardless of whether or not
American aid has any direct bearing on basic human rights, we as scholars and social citizens
of the world have an obligation to resolve our individual dierences for the improvement of
the broader human community we belong to.
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ln(US mil aid)
ln(Population)
ln(GDP per capita)
FDI as % of GDP
Natural resource rents
ln(Oil per capita)
Male pop ages 15-24

(8)
0.017∗∗∗
(0.004)
−1.087∗∗∗
(0.144)
0.194∗∗∗
(0.034)
−6.722
(165.410)
6.716
(165.410)
−0.135∗∗∗
(0.028)
0.029
(0.018)

(9)
0.017∗∗∗
(0.004)
−0.965∗∗∗
(0.178)
0.194∗∗∗
(0.034)
18.962
(165.501)
−18.968
(165.501)
−0.135∗∗∗
(0.028)
0.027
(0.018)
−0.000∗∗∗
(0.000)
−0.002
(0.010)

0.050
0.004
2616

0.053
0.007
2616

ln(US Hum aid)
ln(DAC Hum aid)
In conict?
Elections
Polity score
Terrorist bombings
R2
Adj. R2
Num. obs.
∗∗∗ p

< 0.01,

∗∗ p

(10)
0.010∗∗∗
(0.004)
−1.363∗∗∗
(0.176)
0.083∗∗
(0.036)
101.088
(158.677)
−101.093
(158.677)
−0.058∗∗
(0.028)
0.022
(0.018)
−0.000∗∗∗
(0.000)
−0.018∗
(0.010)
−1.250∗∗∗
(0.090)
0.035
(0.041)
0.062∗∗∗
(0.008)
−0.007
(0.020)
0.142
0.099
2500

< 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1

Table 5.1: Robustness checks using the CIRI physical integrity rights index instead of aggregate PTS score. Higher scores are less repressive, therefore we see a change in the direction
of the relationship across all vraiables.
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ln(US mil aid)
ln(Population)
ln(GDP per capita)
FDI as % of GDP
Natural resource rents
ln(Oil per capita)
Male pop ages 15-24

(11)
0.044∗∗∗
(0.005)
−1.804∗∗∗
(0.201)
0.384∗∗∗
(0.048)
466.691∗∗
(230.513)
−466.676∗∗
(230.513)
−0.267∗∗∗
(0.039)
0.099∗∗∗
(0.025)

(12)
0.044∗∗∗
(0.005)
−2.125∗∗∗
(0.247)
0.387∗∗∗
(0.048)
459.600∗∗
(230.683)
−459.586∗∗
(230.683)
−0.270∗∗∗
(0.039)
0.100∗∗∗
(0.025)
−0.000∗
(0.000)
0.039∗∗∗
(0.014)

0.108
0.066
2624

0.111
0.068
2624

ln(US Hum aid)
ln(DAC Hum aid)
In conict?
Elections
Polity score
Terrorist bombings
R2
Adj. R2
Num. obs.
∗∗∗ p

< 0.01,

∗∗ p

(13)
0.018∗∗∗
(0.005)
−2.681∗∗∗
(0.223)
0.160∗∗∗
(0.045)
366.280∗
(202.190)
−366.272∗
(202.190)
−0.116∗∗∗
(0.036)
0.079∗∗∗
(0.022)
−0.000∗∗∗
(0.000)
−0.030∗∗
(0.013)
−0.173
(0.115)
0.047
(0.052)
0.291∗∗∗
(0.011)
−0.070∗∗∗
(0.025)
0.334
0.301
2508

< 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1

Table 5.2: Robustness check model using CIRI's empowerment rights index which aggregates
availability of civil liberties. Some variables have lost signicance or robust sign direction as
compared to indicators of physical integrity violations.

69

Matthews

Thesis

Cold War
Global War on Terror
1990s
R2
Adj. R2
Num. obs.
RMSE
∗∗∗ p

< 0.01,

∗∗ p

Era eect
2.340∗∗∗
(0.025)
0.142∗∗∗
(0.032)
0.118∗∗∗
(0.036)
0.003
0.003
6842
1.113

< 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1

Table 5.3: Year-xed eect results, grouped by three eras: The Cold War, the Global War
on Terror, and the 1990s. Interestingly, we see that repression has signicantly increased on
average between eras, likely reecting many civil conicts in the 1990s.

Intercept
Conct
Election year?
Poliy Score
Era: GWOT
Era: 1990s
AIC
BIC
Log Likelihood
Deviance
Num. obs.
∗∗∗ p

< 0.01,

∗∗ p

Population
1.765∗∗∗
(0.068)
0.419∗∗
(0.171)
0.133
(0.117)
0.021∗∗∗
(0.008)
1.405∗∗∗
(0.301)
0.961∗∗∗
(0.177)
644.125
683.646
-316.063
632.125
5361

FDI
0.809∗∗∗
(0.039)
−0.063
(0.064)
0.189∗∗∗
(0.054)
0.043∗∗∗
(0.004)
1.208∗∗∗
(0.083)
0.563∗∗∗
(0.059)
3042.556
3082.077
-1515.278
3030.556
5361

Resource rents
0.809∗∗∗
(0.039)
−0.063
(0.064)
0.189∗∗∗
(0.054)
0.043∗∗∗
(0.004)
1.208∗∗∗
(0.083)
0.563∗∗∗
(0.059)
3042.556
3082.077
-1515.278
3030.556
5361

Oil PC
0.067∗∗
(0.032)
0.329∗∗∗
(0.047)
0.037
(0.031)
−0.007∗∗∗
(0.003)
0.149∗∗∗
(0.044)
0.078∗
(0.044)
7245.604
7285.125
-3616.802
7233.604
5361

Male pop
2.161∗∗∗
(0.122)
0.259
(0.181)
0.189
(0.161)
0.071∗∗∗
(0.015)
1.157∗∗∗
(0.322)
1.197∗∗∗
(0.313)
480.355
519.876
-234.177
468.355
5361

< 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1

Table 5.4: Probit test explaining any missingness in macroeconomic development indicators.
While it was expected that much missingness would be associated with conict, this was not
the case: being in conict was associated with more complete data in relation to population
and oil rents per capita.
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The total dollar value of US military aid, excluding arms transfers. Funding cate-

gories include international training, nancing, counter-drug funding, peacekeeping

American

military aid

tribute to the perceived terror in a population.

Repression is equivalent to human rights abuses, measured across four categories:

physical integrity, civil rights and liberties, women's rights, and freedom of the judi-

ciary. Each is divided into sub-categories, and these are then coded and scored along

violations

Repression

multiple

types

This dataset details country-year conict events where at least one party involved

was the state. One of many datasets produced by the Uppsala Conict Data Program

Total GDP of a state in a particular year (logged for analysis)

ict

GDP

explanation for state-sponsored repression.

analysis will exclude commercial development aid as I do not view this as a competing

This dataset includes all public Chinese aid disbursals across dierent sectors. This

Armed Con-

disbursals

aid

index does not distinguish between dierent sources terrornon-state actors can con-

integrity

Chinese

including torture, extrajudicial killings, and indenite detentions. Unlike CIRI, this

physical

a dierent continuous scale for each freedom.

This measure exclusively details the human condition of physical integrity rights,

Repression

operations, cooperative threat reduction, and unspecied assistance

Purpose and Description

Data

Table 5.3: Variable Descriptions

2017

1960-

2017

1989-

2011

2000-

2011

1981-

2016

1976-

2016

1946-

Years

World Bank, 2018

UCDP

nance Dataset

Global Chinese Fi-

Dataset

CIRI Human Rights

Political Terror Scale

USAID Greenbook

Data Source
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FDI stock accumulated by a given state in a given year as proportion of total GDP

The value of unprocessed natural resource exports, including minerals, fossil fuels,

and forestry, as a proportion of total GDP

FDI Stock

Natural

resource

The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development publishes various

DAC

these, I include data on humanitarian aid both as a competing aid source and as a

Aid

Regime type

humanitarian aid separately from the DAC. This is an additional humanitarian aid

tarian Aid

19762016

anocracy. A competing explanation to be interacted with American military aid.

2016

1995-

2016

1995-

2017

1960-

2017

1960-

2017

1960-

Years

A continuous dataset converted into three categories: autocracy, democracy, and

with DAC Humanitarian aid, I only include data from the same years.

control for natural disasters and conict. For compatibility and potential merging

source and potentially competitive to US military aid, while also aiding in eorts to

Although the United States is a member of the DAC, its aid agencies also provide

US Humani-

Assistance Committee, a group of principally European and some East Asian donors.

proxy for natural disasters and conict. Data are available from the Development

datums on aid donations from a variety of donors and for various purposes. Of

manitarian

Hu-

The value of oil exports as a proportion of total GDP

Oil revenue

rents

Purpose and Description

Data

Table 5.3: Variable Descriptions, cont.

Aid

Polity IV Index

plorer, 2018

USAID

OECD

Ex-

World Bank, 2018

World Bank, 2018

World Bank, 2018

Data Source
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a particular country year. Included are exports from the United States, Soviet Union,

China and the sum of 17 European member-states of the DAC. These exporters

weapons

exports

greater than 15 casualties in a given country year. Reects possibility internal shock

bombings

disrupts policing capacity and rallies dissidents.

An edited country-year aggregate representing number of terrorist attacks with

2016

1990-

2016

elections in a given country year. Controls for potential election-related repression

and conict.

1976-

2017

1950-

Years

A composite score representing the number of national (legislative and executive)

countries.

China from 2000 to present) and to serve as a proxy for military aid from DAC

Terrorist

Elections

The trend-indicator value of total military hardware exports to recipient countries for

Military

are included for continuity and comparison temporally (Soviet Union from 1976-89,

Purpose and Description

Data

Table 5.3: Variable Descriptions, cont.

TIV

Systemic Peace

V-Dem 8.0

Tables

porter/Exporter

SIPRI

Data Source

Im-
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